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Editor’s note
Believe it or not, this issue marks the start of CentrePiece’s
third year. I hope that those of you who’ve been reading
the magazine since the first issue will agree that we’ve lost
none of our bite; the quality and range of articles in this
issue can, I think, match any of our earlier ones. And we
remain at the cutting edge of economic and related
research. Our cover story, on telephone call centres,
breaks completely new ground: it’s a sneak preview of 
the work which its author Sue Fernie and her colleague 
David Metcalf (the Centre’s Deputy Director) are
completing for a book to be published later this year. 
Although the study of call centres is based on UK data, 
the subject has a global relevance – Britain and the 
US happen currently to be the world leaders in the
development of such centres.  But I hope our international
readers, of whom I know there are many, will forgive the
fact that many of the pieces in this issue have a British
slant. The Centre is as much concerned with the world
beyond Britain’s shores as it is with the UK economy, and
we try to reflect that in CentrePiece. But we also try to
ensure that we publish the most interesting material
available at a particular time. 
As usual, several of our pieces have links. Hilary Steedman
is no stranger to these pages: she argues that radical
steps are needed to tackle Britain’s acute low skills
problem. Susan Harkness looks at a manifestation of that
problem in her analysis of the pay gap between full- and
part-time women workers. And Mari Sako looks at another
kind of pay – and productivity – gap opening up: one which
she believes could have dangerous consequences for
Britain’s car industry. Back at the low pay end of the
spectrum, Donna Brown comes up with an interesting way
in which some employers might, perhaps unwittingly,
benefit from a national minimum wage. 
Standing in for her husband Danny, Kathleen Tyson Quah
writes the Weightless Economy column in this issue: in her
view, globalisation of many ‘weightless’ activities is now as
inevitable as the fact that some people will always want to
climb Mount Everest. 
And our other guest columnists, Bridget Rosewell and
Ruth Lea, return to the debate which featured heavily in
our last issue: should the UK join the single European
currency. They concentrate on the economic arguments –
but still come up with different answers. 
Here at CentrePiece we always like to be innovative. This
issue is different in a number of ways.  Do let us know
what you think: if your letter is stimulating enough, we’ll
publish it.  And it couldn’t be easier: you can now email us
direct: centrepiece@lse.ac.uk 
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artnership is the buzzword in the British car indus-
try these days. In particular, partnerships between
the car makers themselves and component makers
are supposed to deliver better international compet-
itiveness for the UK industry. Management likes the idea –
it’s advocated by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and
Traders (SMMT). Government, in the form of New Labour,
does too. Even the unions seem to endorse the principle.
Bill Morris, General Secretary of the Transport and General
Workers Union talked about making a contribution or even
total commitment, a not dissimilar sentiment to that of
Rover’s Chief Executive, Walter Hasselkus, who spoke of
the need for positive cooperation, not just acquiescence. It
sounds persuasive. But is it the right way forward?
The short answer is no – at least not without a radical shake-
up in some parts of the industry. The viability of partnerships
depends crucially on how improvements are made; and how
gains from such improvements are distributed. The role of
lean production is crucial. By applying lean production
techniques, UK vehicle manufacturers have made signifi-
cant improvements in productivity. But the evidence
suggests that component suppliers are, on average, lagging
far behind in their performance. There is thus a widening
gap between the companies which make cars, and those
which make parts for them – a gap which does not bode
well for the industry’s future.
The lean production debate
Quite simply, lean production is a set of operational princi-
ples aimed at enhancing a company’s performance. These
principles include the elimination of waste; an objective of
continuous improvement; and flexible work organisation
2
The fashion for
partnerships
between car and
component makers
may be harmful
unless component
makers become
more efficient,
argues Mari Sako.
Another crisis
in Britain’s car industry
involving teamwork and multi-skilling. The diffusion of these
lean production principles has inevitably led to a debate
about the consequences of their adoption. The main
argument is whether lean production is good or bad for
workers within assembly plants. The proponents of lean
production emphasise the beneficial effects of team work,
problem-solving groups and other employee involvement
practices on both business efficiency and the well-being of
workers. The critics focus instead on the attempts to speed
up work patterns, intensified supervision and the incorpora-
tion of team leaders into the management structure as detri-
mental for workers’ well-being. While lean production may be
good for companies, these critics argue, it’s bad for workers.
At one level, this debate is about labour-management
relations within the firm. But it actually goes much wider: it’s
a debate about relationships between firms, because car-
makers are able to outsource so much of their parts produc-
tion. In this wider context, the argument is whether lean
production at car assembly plants has been adopted to
benefit parts suppliers – or at their expense. The advocates
of lean production argue that lean assembly plants nurture
lean suppliers, who also benefit from the reduction in inven-
tories, high productivity and wage growth which the 
car makers themselves enjoy. Critics respond that in reality
assembly plants have been able to shift the burden of inven-
tory-holding onto their suppliers, who are used as buffers.
As a consequence, the suppliers face insecure business
prospects and are unable to invest in productivity-enhancing
practices. Workers at these supplier plants in turn suffer
from low pay and job insecurity.
The British evidence
So who’s right? A study of the Census of Production data
for the UK from 1979-1992 reveals some interesting – and
disturbing – trends. The clearest indicator of whether lean
production has been adopted or not is the reduction in
inventory levels (supporting the principle of eliminating
waste). Inventories in the automotive supply chain can be
divided between inter-firm inventories, consisting of raw
materials and finished goods, held as part of the trading
relationship between firms; and internal work-in-progress
inventories needed to accommodate variability and delay in
manufacturing processes. During the thirteen year period,
the raw material inventories of assembly plants and the
finished goods inventories of suppliers fell by 60% and 65%
respectively. Work in progress inventories fell by just over
70% in both categories of firms. This parallel reduction 
in inventories lends support to the proponents’ view that
lean production has been successfully diffused down the
supply chain. 
But if such inventory reduction occurs as part of a lean
production system, it should be linked to significant produc-
tivity growth. Typically, shopfloor improvement processes
focus on eliminating all types of waste, and result not only in
inventory reduction, but often also improved space utilisa-
tion, better standardised working methods and a reduction
in manpower. Since inventories in the UK declined at much
the same pace in both assembly plants and suppliers, we
might expect to see productivity growing at much the same
pace as well. 
And international comparisons
This is not the case. Real labour productivity (measured by
gross added value per head) rose three times faster at
assembly plants than at suppliers’ plants in Britain. This is
pretty much the same ratio as in the US. But it’s strikingly
different from the experience in Japan and Germany, where
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The productivity growth differential between UK assemblers and suppliers is reflected 
in the growing gap between the average pay of workers at the two types of plant. 
both suppliers and assemblers were able to improve
productivity at similar rates. The productivity growth differ-
ential between UK assemblers and suppliers is reflected in
the growing gap between the average pay of workers at the
two types of plant. 
Figure 1 (previous page) shows the average annual pay per
head at supplier plants as a ratio of pay per head at assem-
bly plants. In 1979, British supply plant workers enjoyed
about 90% of assembly workers’ pay; this declined steadily
to 75% in 1992. Contrast this with the Japanese experi-
ence, where wages at supplier plants have been consis-
tently lower, at about 73% of assembly plant workers’ pay.
This much lower ratio has, in the past, been cited as
evidence of the dualistic structure of the Japanese economy.
By 1992, the figures suggest, the dualism of the automotive
market was no longer peculiar to Japan.
It’s a similar story in the US, where supply-plant workers
saw their pay fall from 85% of the average assembly-plant
worker’s wage in 1980 to 74% in 1993. But in West
Germany industry-level collective bargaining is still largely
intact in the car industry, and the relative pay ratio has stayed
constant, at about 85%.
Why do supply workers fare worse?
It’s not difficult to see why, in the UK, supply workers’ pay
has fallen in relative terms. The UK’s New Earnings Survey
enables us to deduce that it is the hourly wage rate at supply
plants which has declined relative to rates at car assembly
plants. To do this, we first of all concentrate on full-time
manual male workers, in order to eliminate gender, status
and occupational composition effects. Then we look at
trends in work hours separately from hourly rates. We find
that the basic weekly hours of full-time male manual workers
have been falling very gently at both supplier and assembly
plants: from 39 hours a week, to 37.5 hours. But we also
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We also find that at supply plants, more hours overtime have been worked; and that this overtime
has fluctuated more, lending support to the view that assembly plants use suppliers as buffers.
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find that at supply plants, more hours overtime have been
worked; and that this overtime has fluctuated more, lending
support to the view that assembly plants use suppliers as
buffers (see Figure 2, left, which shows the ratio of supplier
hours and pay as a proportion of assembly plant hours and
pay). It’s nevertheless clear that what accounts for the
decline in supply plant workers’ annual take home pay is the
relative decline in their basic hourly earnings (excluding
overtime pay and hours), from nearly the same level –
99.7% – in 1983 to 84% in 1996.
The parallel reduction in inventories at both assembly and
supply plants initially appears to support the optimistic view
that lean production is smoothly diffusing down the supply
chain. This optimistic assessment is more difficult to sustain,
however, because the inventory reduction is not matched by
similar parallel improvements in productivity growth. The
gap between the two seems likely to be the result of the
application of just-in-time techniques at supply plants in
isolation from other concomitant changes in work organisa-
tion and human resource policies which should be made to
obtain long-lasting improvements.
The clear consequence of these trends is that in the 1980s a
distinct dualistic structure has emerged in the labour market
of the UK car industry, with workers at supply plants receiv-
ing significantly lower pay than those at assembly plants.
Figure 3 (left) shows this trend in perspective: it is not suppli-
ers’ wages which have fallen behind, but assembly workers’
wages which have seen exceptionally high growth.
Cause for concern?
What these pay trends reveal, of course, is the persistently
low productivity growth in car component suppliers. This is
something which should concern management, labour and
policymakers alike. It’s true that managers might be content
that wage levels reflect productivity at the individual plant
level. But low productivity growth at the supplier level will
inevitably be reflected in high unit costs for UK-manufac-
tured components; this in turn undermines the international
competitiveness of British cars. As firms disintegrate, and
outsource more and more of their operations, it becomes
ever more important to strengthen the mechanisms for
diffusing innovative practices across firm boundaries. This
could be done in a number of ways: through the introduction
of supplier development programmes by assemblers;
through Japanese-style supplier associations; and through
third-party programmes such as the provision of technical
assistance by the SMMT Industry Forum. 
Of course, the decentralisation of collective bargaining in
the engineering-related component sector, the decline in the
average size of plants, and the decline in trade union inten-
sity have all contributed to a reduction in the bargaining
power of unions based at component suppliers. But the
synchronisation of production between assembly plants and
some of the suppliers, such as that between Ford and
Johnson Controls, both based at Dagenham, has created a
degree of interdependence which unions can use to
strengthen their bargaining power. And in the near future,
the creation of supplier business parks by the major UK-
based vehicle manufacturers will mean that more and more
workers employed by component suppliers are working on
the same site as assembly workers.
These changes in the mode of vehicle production, from
mass production by a single highly integrated supplier to
flexible production by a lean assembler with suppliers of
modules located close by, are likely to change the definition
of the internal labour market. It is quite possible, likely even,
that workers based on the same site in synchronised
production processes would demand pay parity, regardless
of who their employer actually is. Trade unions should focus
on bargaining accordingly, while working towards improved
productivity at component suppliers.
The challenge of achieving productivity improvements at car
component suppliers is therefore one facing both manage-
ment and unions. Failure to meet that challenge could under-
mine the dramatic progress made in the rest of the car
industry in the past few years.
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Mari Sako is a Research Associate of the CEP and Professor 
of International Business at the University of Oxford. 
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H
ave you ever wondered who’s behind the friendly
Scottish voice which so helpfully and speedily
deals with your banking or your car insurance or
your directory enquiry? Have you ever been
convinced by a persuasive BT salesperson that you can’t
cope without ‘Friends and Family’ or call waiting? These
faceless creatures at the end of the phone who work round
the clock and never lose their temper are known as
‘computer telephonists’, and are the fastest-growing
occupational group in the UK today. The nature of their work
means that we can find out much more about the way
people work and how they respond to their working environ-
ment. But does more information make for better working
practices? Or is it the twentieth-century version of
workplace tyranny? 
Factories of the future?
Computer telephonists work in call centres of which there
are presently some 7,000, employing over 200,000
computer telephonists (‘agents’) in Britain. The UK now
accounts for half of all the agent positions in Europe. 1.1%
of the workforce is employed in call centres, with this
proportion predicted to double, 2.2%, by 2001.
Significantly, most call centres are located outside London
and the South East: the supply of greenfield sites coupled
with regional grants and lower wages make migration of
large tele operations like British Airways ticket sales and
London Electricity enquiries inevitable. Regional accents are
also important: studies show that the public perceives the
Scottish accent to convey reliability, while other accents,
such as the Brummie twang, tend to be associated in some
people’s minds with criminal tendencies!
Most call centres deal with incoming calls: changes in the
ways businesses work, such as banks and travel compa-
nies, means that more and more work is done over the
phone. It’s more than once that I have called mail order firms
at midnight to order the children’s clothes; busy people need
24-hour shopping. In the centres, the agent answers the
phone call routed to him or her and simultaneously uses a
computer to process the information. At most centres, calls
are ‘force fed’ – the agent has no control over whether or
not to answer and as soon as one call is over another is put
through. All time is monitored – whether the agent is
involved in dealing with calls, ‘wrapping up’ or unavailable
for other reasons. The technology that makes this possible
is called ACD – automatic call distribution.
Total control
The possibilities for monitoring behaviour and measuring
output in call centres are amazing to behold – the ‘tyranny of
the assembly line’ is but a Sunday school picnic compared
with the control that management can exercise in computer
telephony. Indeed, the advertising brochure for a popular
call centre software package is titled TOTAL CONTROL
MADE EASY. Critics refer to them as new sweatshops and
battery farms. Agents’ activities are monitored in real time by
the supervisor. Real time screens display status information
such as the number of existing calls in queue, how long the
oldest call has been waiting, how many agents are on calls
and how many are logged out or unavailable. Schedule
adherence monitoring allows the supervisor to see whether
agents are adhering to what they are scheduled to be doing
at any given moment. There is also, in most centres, the
large, LED display looking down on the agents as a further
reminder of their aims; the number of calls waiting to be
answered in 6-inch-high red letters is a big brother from
which no-one can hide.
Bentham’s vision come true?
Over 200 years ago, Jeremy Bentham put forward a design
for the ideal prison, the Panopticon, and more recently
Foucault used this composition as a metaphor for the
coming workplace. For call centres, Bentham’s Panopticon
was truly the vision of the future and call centres are the
epitome of what Foucault had in mind:
All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central
tower and to shut up in each cell... a worker... They are like
so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor
is alone, perfectly individualised and constantly visible...
Visibility is a trap... Each individual is securely confined to a
cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor;
but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with
his companions. He is seen but does not see; he is the
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Call centres – the workplaces of the future or the sweatshops of the 
past in a new disguise? Sue Fernie reports on groundbreaking research
at the CEP. 
object of information, never a subject in communication...
this invisibility is the guarantee of order... there are no 
disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those distractions
that slow down the rate of work, make it less perfect...
power should be visible and unverifiable. (Discipline and
Punish, 1977)
In call centres the agents are constantly visible and the
supervisor’s power has indeed been rendered perfect – via
the computer monitoring screen – and therefore its actual
use unnecessary.  Yet with no apparent trace of irony, some
commentators stress the advantages of this process to the
agent: the benefit to the representatives is freedom from
uncertainty... management can state clear performance
objectives and use the adherence statistics as one way to
provide clear and quick feedback on each individualÕs attain-
ment of these objectives. (Voice Processing, May 1994) 
The process of reward
The ‘industrialisation’ of this white-collar work – the possi-
bility for complete monitoring of input and accurate
measurement of output – has brought with it a whole new
way of rewarding employees, which we normally associate
with traditional manual work. Straightforward monthly
salaries are giving way to bonus systems, and 24-hour
opening brings with it a plethora of overtime shift premiums
hitherto unknown in the office. Our studies of computer
telephonists have focused on incentives: in particular, the
way in which similar organisations choose different
payment and the effects of these payment systems on finan-
cial and industrial relations outcomes, such as productivity 
and turnover. 
Whether it is better to pay workers time rates or piece rates
(per hour or per unit of output) is a question that, perhaps
surprisingly, has received little attention in Britain since the
reports of the National Board for Prices and Incomes in the
1960s tackled the problems of wage drift. However, in the
US today, there is a body of work known as the new
economics of personnel (NEP) which analyses the choice of
payment systems in a cost-benefit framework, and tries to
predict why particular firms choose particular ways of
paying and motivating staff.
Choosing the payment system
Ed Lazear, a major proponent of the NEP approach, distin-
guishes between performance related pay (PRP) and basic
salary. Under PRP, such as piece rates, there is ‘synchroni-
sation between output and compensation’. Thus, under
PRP, one period’s output or performance influences the pay
received in that same period. By contrast, under the basic
salary approach, workers’ pay is independent of this
period’s output or performance.
The most common explanations for the incidence and extent
of PRP turn on measurement and monitoring costs. When
monitoring behaviour and effort is costly, the firm is less
likely to use standard time rates or salary and more likely to
use an output or performance-based pay measure.
Alternatively, when the cost of measuring output is high, the
organisation will use time rates. Of course, such predictions
are not the exclusive of preserve of NEP. For example, Marx
noted that PRP will be used when monitoring behaviour and
effort is difficult and that individuals on piece rates will
receive higher pay than those on time rates. And the British
institutional writers of the 1960s such as Gowler and Lupton
anticipated many of the NEP predictions in their contingency
theory approach. Even Julius Caesar boosted the efficiency
of the Roman army by instituting performance related pay in
lieu of booty.
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There are at least thirty
times as many computer
telephonists as coal miners
in Britain today; more
people work in this sector
than in coal, steel and vehicle 
production put together.
In addition to monitoring input and measuring output, NEP
considers three other categories of variables as playing a
role in determining payment systems: product market
characteristics such as quality/quantity trade-offs and the
extent of competition; labour market characteristics such as
union recognition, length of tenure and pay the employee
could earn elsewhere; and the nature of the job, such as the
span of managerial control, workgroup size, team produc-
tion and technical change. 
Call centres: the empirical test
Call centres provide us with a marvellous opportunity to test
the NEP approach to choice of payment system because of
the ease of monitoring input and measuring output. We are
therefore able to examine the theory in the light of empirical
evidence – something which very few studies have thus far
been able to do. Most econometric studies have to use
proxies for the ability to monitor input such as, for example,
workplace size; by contrast, for call centres we can observe
and report the actual process of monitoring and supervision,
and so our evidence relates directly to what the theory actually
predicts rather than some imperfect proxy variable.
We’ve conducted detailed case studies of three call centres.
The first is an executive agency (EA) which provides informa-
tion technology to support social security provision. Here we
have focused on the service help desk which ensures that
customers’ queries are dealt with promptly. The help desk
employs 80 people and receives nearly 600,000 calls per
year. Calls must be answered within 15 seconds, calls are
logged, and priorities are agreed concerning resolution time.
The help desk agent follows a script on his or her computer
which makes sure that the problem can be accurately identi-
fied. The agent then contacts the service providers who liaise
with the customer via the agent, enabling the agent to resolve
and close the incident.
We also looked at a market-tested department of a London
borough which collects parking and clamping fines via credit
cards (PK). This organisation employs 27 agents and deals
with over 400,000 calls a year. Calls must be answered within
15 seconds, logged and the caller persuaded to part with a
credit card number within 170 seconds.
Our third case study was the classified advertising depart-
ment of a large daily newspaper with a circulation of half a
million and a readership of 1.2 million (AD). The 40 employ-
ees who we studied deal with customers who phone in
wishing to place an advertisement, advising callers on appro-
priate wording and style. They must also possess layout and
other computer skills to prepare the advert for onward trans-
mission to the composers.
Spot the differences...
On the face of it, the jobs we looked at seem very similar.
Yet we found that the organisations use an array of different
payment systems. EA make some modest use of PRP (up to
a maximum of 7% of the basic salary). The PRP element is
linked to each individual’s performance, and is consolidated
each year. There is no longer automatic progression up a
pay scale; so for most employees the consolidated PRP
means an annual pay rise not much different from that
provided under the old system. PK’s approach is in sharp
contrast to this. Although any one individual’s performance
is wholly unrelated to that of anyone else, and in spite of the
fact that agents have no information about the performance
of others, PK has a team-based PRP system, with the PRP
element accounting for up to one fifth of total pay. None of
this significant proportion of total pay is linked to individual
effort. AD has a PRP system which draws on elements of
both the other schemes: there are individual and team-
related components. But the most striking feature of the AD
approach is the size of the PRP element, which can be as
high as 53%. 
...and explain them
The underlying theory of the new economics of personnel
ought to be able to explain satisfactorily why the element of
performance related pay varies so widely among organisa-
tions which offer similar opportunities for monitoring
workplace performance. In fact, the differences in the ratio
of PRP to basic pay we have identified are, for the most part,
easily explained by the relative costs and benefits of measur-
ing output and monitoring input. Consider our classified
advertising department, AD. Here, it is output (revenue) that
matters. Incoming calls are not force-fed and there is no
9
Call centres we can observe and report 
the actual process of monitoring and supervision,
and so our evidence relates directly to what the
theory actually predicts rather than some
imperfect proxy variable.
time limit on calls – rather the emphasis is on customer
service in order to generate revenues to the newspaper. All
targets for the team and individuals are defined in terms of
output. Both management and agents expect individuals and
teams to reach the minimum targets comfortably: thereafter,
the incentive structure is highly geared to encourage those
targets to be exceeded. Technology may make it easy to
monitor calls, but in this instance it is the output measure-
ment which dominates – hence a PRP structure encourages
agents to exceed targets.
By contrast, at EA, the agents are intermediaries: their input
has an influence on, but does not actually determine, the
time taken for the incident to be resolved – the output. EA
monitor the behaviour of the agent very thoroughly, collect-
ing information on telephone responsiveness, the number of
calls abandoned, agent availability, short calls, calls taken,
ongoing calls, length of call, time taken to assign incidents,
correct assignment of incidents and correct use of call base.
NEP predicts that time rates will dominate when the empha-
sis is on monitoring inputs rather than measuring outputs,
and this prediction holds true for EA. 
In the case of PK, however, the job is completely individual-
based, and no employee has any knowledge of the perfor-
mance of other employees; yet the PRP assessment is
entirely team-based. Although this appears to go against the
predictions of NEP, one explanation could be that PRP is
actually a cover for rewarding agents without disrupting the
wider local authority job evaluation scheme.
The impact on performance
But we haven’t confined our examination of call centres to
the three case studies outlined above. We also conducted
a postal survey of 250 call centre managers. We had 105
completed questionnaires, a 41% response rate which is
high for a postal survey. The aim of this survey was to
examine the associations between three sets of variables:
the type of payment system, the appraisal and monitoring
arrangements, and the characteristics of the labour 
and product markets; and four performance outcome
variables – productivity, financial performance, pay and
labour turnover. Again taking NEP as our theoretical 
framework, the performance of the call centres whose
managers responded to our survey was analysed using
regression analysis.
Employment in our sample ranged from 3 to 1,500 with an
average of 167. Nearly three-quarters of the centres used
ACD technology to ‘force feed’ calls to agents. Opening
times ranged from 35 to 168 hours a week with an average
of 93 hours. One quarter of our sample, the largest 
single group, were in the financial sector; then came 
utilities (15%), helpdesks (15%) and travel operations
(14%); the remainder were in telesales, home shopping 
and consumer products.
It is clear from the survey results that supervision and
appraisal practices have a profound influence on centre
performance. A centre with more intense supervision
(relatively fewer agents per supervisor) and regular
appraisal has better productivity and financial performance,
lower labour turnover and higher pay than one with less
intense supervision. As we’ve already seen, technology –
particularly the use of ACD systems – makes monitoring
agents’ effort and performance easy in call centres.
Numerous indicators of productivity exist such as time taken
to answer calls, time taken to deal with them, the number of
lost calls, and so on. What our survey results show is that
these monitoring possibilities have to be blended with
proper supervision and appraisal. This may in turn result, for
example, in the setting of clearer targets, which has been
consistently shown to improve performance.
But another of our key findings showed that performance
related pay by itself is insufficient to enhance centre perfor-
mance: only team-related PRP or a combination of individ-
ual plus team-based PRP will have an impact. Only 9% of
centres in our sample have adopted team-related PRP, yet
these organisations perform significantly better than others
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(relatively fewer agents per supervisor) and
regular appraisal has better productivity
and financial performance, lower labour
turnover and higher pay
than one with less
intense supervision.
on both the productivity and financial performance indica-
tors. Our case study evidence suggests two reasons why
team-based payment systems are important. First, the
monitoring possibilities render agents’ activities transpar-
ent, making the free rider problem less likely to arise.
Second, peer group pressure does matter, and operates
along the lines of a ‘gift exchange’ model. Work group
norms develop, and each employee values fair treatment for
him/herself. Pay inequality within a group may be perceived
as unfair and thus lead to reduced effort.
Interestingly, the potential maximum PRP available is
unrelated to performance; rather, it is what is actually paid
that matters. If a centre uses PRP it only achieves superior
performance if its system yields a high average actual
rather than potential payment relative to basic pay. Thus
performance is unaffected by whether or not the PRP
system is highly geared or not. This is because a highly
levered system of PRP is much more sensitive to changes
in performance: in an extreme case, for instance, PRP
could account for between 0% and 100% of basic pay, but
it might be very difficult to achieve high PRP payments in
practice. A scheme designed to offer between 5% and
15% might be more effective if most employees could
expect to obtain the maximum. Those call centres with PRP
payouts above 8% of basic salary have better productivity
and financial performance than those paying less than this.
Some subsidiary results from our survey analysis are also
worth noting. Competition in product markets, for instance,
does make a difference. Those centres which face intense
competition have higher productivity and worse financial
performance than those with modest or no competition.
And larger centres have higher productivity and better
financial performance but, surprisingly, lower pay.
But what about the workers?
It’s already clear from our findings that call centres, and the
huge amount of data they can provide, are a goldmine for
those trying to find out more about what motivates people at
work, and how to organise the workplace more efficiently.
But what about the people employed in these centres, with
their closely monitored and controlled working environment?
Are they the factory sweatshops of the future?
A formal study of employee attitudes is next on our research
agenda. But case study visits have provided the opportunity
to talk at length with call centre workers. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, we have met with some very positive feedback.
Employees appreciate the higher rates of pay they receive in
call centres, and seem to become quickly acclimatised to
the high levels of monitoring. There is a problem of ‘burn
out’, however: eighteen months is usually about as much as
a computer telephonist can cope with. But these are only
initial impressions; in the coming months we shall be looking
in detail at how agents view their jobs and the links between
their perceptions and their performance.
The workplace of the future
There are at least thirty times as many computer telephon-
ists as coal miners in Britain today; more people work in this
sector than in coal, steel and vehicle production put
together. Our focus on these new service jobs is designed
to contribute to a move in industrial relations research
towards emerging forms of employment relationships and
away from traditional preoccupations with male, full-time,
unionised, manufacturing jobs. The call centre provides us
with an excellent backdrop against which to study employee
relations – but we’d better hurry before they’re replaced by
the Internet!
Sue Fernie is a Research Officer at the CEP. She and 
David Metcalf are completing a book on call centres which 
will be published in the autumn.
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T
here are many tales with
which to frighten the children
in the current Euro-debate.
And some of them are indeed
frightening.  There is the potential for
the complete collapse of the European
economy as the new single currency
goes soft and buckles under the
different strains being put on it. There
is the equally frightening possibility of
persistently high unemployment as a
result of a lack of flexibility resulting in
social tension and disaster. The
backwash from economic shocks –
from oil prices rises to Asian
economic disaster – might require
different responses in different
economies which cannot be delivered.
Any of these possibilities conjures up
nightmares of both political and
economic dimensions.
Then there are the dreams. The
dreams of a European federation
which is able to stride confidently on a
world stage, the dream of an open
and transparent market of over 300
million people which could operate as
successfully as the USA and have a
similar hegemony. In such a market
there would be scope both for
economies of scale and niche
marketing, for technological advances
to take root more quickly and for firms
of all sizes to take advantage of new
opportunities. The nation state begins
to be less important, while closer
integration between communities
grows organically.
At first sight, and very much in line
with the human condition, the dreams
look pie in the sky, while the
nightmares seem all too feasible and
realistic. And it is also pretty easy to
conclude that it is not really a good
idea to start from here. The grand
projet of European unity is much
grander than any pyramid in the
Palais du Louvre and also much more
fragile, lacking the complex
framework of scaffolding which holds
up that structure.
But here is where we are. And there
are some fairly simple propositions
which might enable us to look at the
rest of Europe with our eyes open
rather than in a dream state.
The role of trade
One of the most fundamental is about
trade. Industrial capitalism is driven by
trade. Trade has allowed economic
growth to take place, made possible
economies of scale and scope and
encouraged technical innovation.
Human societies are defined by the
amount of trading that they do with
one another, and they have been
getting on with it from prehistoric
times. Certainly, trade has benefited
some more than others, but it has
also removed the threat of extreme
poverty from large sections of the
world’s population. The growth of
trade requires markets, and for those
markets to offer new opportunities.
This is the prize offered by a
successful single market in Europe.
So the question is whether such a
market can be achieved without price
transparency and a single currency. It
seems unlikely. Cross border
transactions remain problematic. Yes,
you can pay with a Eurocheque for
transactions below a certain value. But
try cashing a cheque written in sterling
at a French bank. You will be charged
at least three days’ interest on the
amount while the cheque clears. And
it is nonsense to suggest that hedging
can deal with all currency risk. Not
only does it cost money, but it may not
be available for the required period.
Estimates suggest that these costs
amount to only half a per cent of GDP,
hardly enough to get excited about.
On its own, this is absolutely true.
However, it is not the cost but the
perception and the time and trouble
which matter. Compared to trying to
grow your own business in your own
currency, those extending their
business activities ‘abroad’ face
transactions costs, currency risk as
well as market risk. Remove the
transaction and currency risk and it
becomes much easier to establish
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what the market risk actually is. Are
these potential customers really any
different from those in the ‘home’
market? Maybe not. But you need to
clear all the other dross out of the
way in order to be able to tell. 
So one proposition concerns the
benefits of trade. We might even be
able to strengthen this proposition by
suggesting that in the present period
the nature of trade is changing. More
services and intangibles are being
traded, more knowledge crosses
boundaries. In these circumstances,
the larger the field on which you have
the opportunity to develop such
markets, the less likely you are to be
left behind.
Economic flexibility
The second proposition concerns the
dreaded flexibility – which the UK
apparently has, but which those
Europeans on the other side of the
Channel do not. If the rules of
engagement are different in different
parts of the European mega-economy
then the reactions in the face of shock
will also be different. Let us predicate,
for example, that there is melt-down in
the Far East. This deflationary shock
will require a policy reaction in
Europe. It might also be argued that in
the sclerotic, social democratic
countries of continental Europe, with
their high levels of support for the
unemployed, this will mean that huge
injections of spending power would
be necessary to bring their economies
back into balance. In the UK, on the
other hand, adjustment would happen
more quickly, and hence a smaller
response would be appropriate.
This is the nightmare side of the
dream. And it is a real problem. It is,
of course, clear that the European
countries have not achieved the full
convergence which would make
monetary union easy. Nor are they
ever likely to. There will always be
variation across the continent –
indeed, there is in the US too. Thus
policies will always work better in
some places than in others. This is a
reason for caution and for recognition
that there is an issue here. But it’s
very easy to say that the potential for
shocks and the variation in the
economies mean that nothing should
be done. If it is the case that a larger
and more integrated and transparent
market means that people can and will
be better off, then it also follows that
their economies will be better able to
withstand such shocks, and policy will
also be able to protect the losers
more effectively. 
Seeing into the future
Finally, there is the prediction
problem. Each forecaster has a model
of the economy and can run
stabilisation scenarios of various
sorts. They are all probably irrelevant.
A change of this nature will set in train
changes in the behaviour of economic
agents which existing models have no
way of handling. There will be step
jumps as perceptions shift and small
changes can easily lead, over time, to
large differences in outcome. 
That is why this debate is both so
important and so difficult – the usual
rules do not apply. It is the contention
of this article that the prize of a larger,
transparent market is worth the risk of
our ignorance of how things can and
probably will go wrong. This
conclusion is based on the long
sweep of economic development. It
does not mean that it is easy, or that
the current definition of the
Stabilisation Pact (to take but one
example) is correct. 
But it does mean that if the UK hides
its collective head in the sand and
refuses to get on the train – because
the wheels might fall off; or to join the
party because the ground might be
dangerous; then it might get towed off
into the mid-Atlantic and left there to
rot like some outdated drilling rig.
Even if the party does get a little wild,
I’d rather live a little first.
by Bridget Rosewell
Bridget Rosewell is Chairman of Business Strategies Ltd and a special adviser to the
Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons. She was formerly a member of the
Treasury Panel of Independent Forecasters.
If it is the case that a larger
and more integrated and
transparent market means
that people can and will be
better off, then it also
follows that their economies
will be better able to
withstand such shocks.
J
ust in case what follows leads to
any misunderstanding, let me say
at the outset that I am a pro-
European: I support British
membership of the European Union.
But I am a sceptic when it comes to
economic and monetary union in
Europe. I believe that early
membership of EMU would be wrong
for Britain. It should be ruled out for
the foreseeable future.
So why not leave the EU?
Unlike some critics of EMU, however,
I don’t see my views on EMU and EU
membership as being in conflict. I
don’t support the argument that if the
UK is not going to join EMU we
should leave the European Union.
Such a drastic move would be against
British interests on economic grounds
alone. The other EU countries are now
enormously important to us as trading
partners: 60% of our visible trade is
with the EU, for instance. 
Britain’s EU membership has also
been a major contributing factor to our
outstanding success in attracting
inward investment. I saw this at first
hand when I dealt with the promotion
of inward investment in the ‘Invest in
Britain Bureau’ of the Department of
Trade and Industry. I have little doubt
that if Britain were to leave the EU
many of the foreign companies which
have invested here would feel
betrayed and pull out.
EMU is different
But economic and monetary union is a
different matter altogether. From
January 1, 1999, the European
Central Bank (ECB) will be taking the
decisions about the short-term interest
rates that play such a critical role in
the British economy – more so than in
any other European state. EMU
membership would mean the Bank of
England no longer making interest rate
decisions in the light of Britain’s
specific needs. The ECB would make
such decisions for the whole EMU
area according to the needs of the
region as a whole.
Of course, if I felt that the ECB
decisions could make the ‘right’
decisions for the British economy, I
would feel decidedly less nervous
about British membership. I am,
however, convinced that that the ECB
would be highly unlikely to take the
right decisions for Britain. Not out of
spite or malice – but because it
couldn’t. The ECB decisions would
almost certainly lead to interest rates
that were too high (leading to
recession) or too low (leading to
inflation and instability) for the UK.
The threat to economic
stability
The British economy has been very
well-managed over the past five years;
Not for the foreseeable future
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and I am optimistic that the newly
semi-independent Bank of England
will prove a force for stability in future.
This ‘treasure’ must not be thrown
away by entering EMU before we are
clear that the ECB is in a position to
manage our economy as well as
British institutions now can.
There are other tools of
macroeconomic management besides
changes in short-term interest rates –
principally fiscal and exchange rate
policy. But we already know that
within EMU there would be major
constraints on fiscal policy (through
the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact);
and, in any case, fiscal policy is
inappropriate for economic ‘fine
tuning’. And as far as the exchange
rate is concerned, it goes without
saying that EMU would mean the end
of Britain’s ability unilaterally to
influence the value of its currency. So
it’s clear that joining EMU would
effectively hand over the management
of the British economy to EU
institutions.
Britain is different from
continental Europe
At the heart of the problem is the
extent of the differences between
Britain and the continental European
economies. These differences were
clearly outlined in the British Treasury
document UK membership of the
single currency: an assessment of the
five economic tests. This was
published on 27 October last year, to
coincide with the Chancellor’s
statement setting out government
policy on EMU membership. Mr
Brown said that the UK should not
join until five tests – cyclical
convergence, flexibility, beneficial for
investment, right for the City of
London, and helpful for growth,
stability and jobs – had been satisfied.
The cyclical difference is the most
obvious and perhaps most important.
The UK economy is hopelessly adrift
from the continental European cycle –
indeed, it behaves more like the fifty-
first state of the US than a member of
the EU. For this reason the UK needs
different interest rates from the rest of
Europe: a requirement that the ECB,
with its ‘one size fits all’ interest rate
policy, would be in no position to
deliver.
But there are other structural
differences which would tend to pull
our cycle apart from the continental
European economies even if, by
some freak, we managed to bring our
economy into line with theirs. Our
economy is much more sensitive to
movements in short-term interest
rates, particularly because of the 
high incidence of variable mortgage
rates in Britain, than the other
prospective members of EMU. 
Once the UK was subject to ECB-
determined interest rate movements,
the likelihood is that the UK economy
would move out of line with the rest
of continental Europe.
Britain also has a much more diverse
pattern of trade. Half of the UK’s
current account transactions are with
the other countries of the EU – far
more than when Britain first joined the
EEC in 1973. But that still means that
half of the UK’s transaction is with
countries outside the EU. And 15% of
Britain’s visible trade is with North
America – a much greater proportion
than other European countries. If, for
example, the US economy were to go
into recession, the British economy
would be disproportionately affected,
and would need more of a monetary
offset than the other European
countries. In addition, Britain remains
a significant producer of oil. A sharp
rise in oil prices would have very
different effects on the economies of
continental Europe than on the UK –
and would require different policy
responses.
Resolving the differences
Can these structural differences be
resolved? And if so, when? These are
impossible questions to answer. We
don’t know how continental European
economies will change; how Britain
will change; or whether a UK
government will start to manipulate
interest rates and/or fiscal policy in an
attempt to align the cycles more
closely. It’s worth noting, however,
that there was nothing of substance in
Gordon Brown’s statement on
preparations for EMU which would
shift the British economy towards
those of continental Europe. And any
changes which the government were
to make would be unlikely to have
reconciled the economic differences
sufficiently by the early years of the
next Parliament. This suggests to me
that the government’s five tests are a
smokescreen. What the Labour
government seems really concerned
about is the approval of the ‘people’
and whether Ministers could win a
referendum to take Britain into Europe
and so end the UK’s isolation (as they
perceive it) in the world.
Worth the effort?
It is important to remember that there
would be some economic advantages
for Britain in EMU membership.
Transactions costs for European
currencies would be eliminated.
Exchange rate volatility for trade within
the EU would disappear. And there
are political implications for Britain in
staying out of EMU – which is, after
all, a major step towards political as
well as economic integration.
Nevertheless, I remain convinced that
we should not even contemplate entry
until we are absolutely certain that the
ECB can manage the UK economy as
well as we can manage it ourselves.
We should see how EMU develops, at
least over one cycle, to see whether it
is a sustainable success. We must be
convinced that the major economic
differences between the UK and the
other EMU members have been
resolved.
As I’ve said, it’s impossible to say
how long this will take. But I can’t see
Britain being ready to join EMU for the
foreseeable future: and probably not
for at least ten years.
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Ruth Lea, now Head of Policy at the
Institute of Directors, is a former Chief
Economist at Mitsubishi Bank.
B
ritish employers have long complained about low
literacy and numeracy standards among the
workforce from which they have to recruit staff.
There can now be no doubt that they are right. A
considerable body of evidence published over the past two
years shows that Britain has a more acute problem with low
skills – among both young people and adults – than any
other industrial country except the United States. This is a
problem the new Labour government is at least as commit-
ted to tackling as its Conservative predecessor. But it’s clear
that tackling this problem will require enormous effort – and
a change of attitudes – on the part of government, employ-
ers, and individuals.
The scale of the problem
In 1996 the then Conservative government published a
report based on research carried out at the Centre for
Economic Performance which claimed that Britain – and the
US – had a much more serious problem of low skills than
other European countries or indeed an Asian country –
Singapore1. Those findings have now been confirmed by an
authoritative survey published in October 1997 by the Office
for National Statistics2. Britain does indeed have a low skills
problem and it shares that problem with the United States. 
The findings of the British studies have been reinforced by
the OECD’s International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS)3
which has now produced results for seven countries –
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland,
the US and Great Britain.3 In each country a randomly
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selected national sample of adults aged between 16 and 64
completed tests designed to assess literacy on a scale
ranked 1-5. Level 1 denotes a very basic level and 5 denotes
the sort of literacy skills that might be associated with a
university graduate. In keeping with this more sophisticated
definition of literacy – viewed as a continuum rather than as
a condition that adults either do or do not have – three
separate literacy scales were used to assess how well
adults could use printed and written information to function
in society. The prose scale tested the ability to extract infor-
mation from a piece of continuous prose – for example, at
Level 1 the task was to interpret instructions on a box of
aspirin – while the document scale tested ability to cope with
the sort of text found in the workplace. The quantitative scale
tested ability to apply arithmetic operations to numbers
embedded in printed materials: at Level 1 the task was to
perform a single operation such as addition for which the
problem is already clearly stated or the numbers are
provided.
The IALS for Great Britain was carried out two years later
than the main study covering the other six countries. We are
therefore only now in a position to assess the British perfor-
mance against that of other advanced industrialised
countries. The results show a significant gap between the
other West European countries – Germany, Sweden,
Switzerland and the Netherlands – where only a small
proportion of the population falls into the low skills category,
and the US and Great Britain where more than one fifth of
the population falls into this category (Figure 1 right).
At the other end of the scale, levels 4/5, the British perfor-
mance is closer to the international average – only Sweden
and Germany have higher quantitative literacy scores than
Britain. Britain’s most noticeable deficit comes at the next
level down, Level 3, the high intermediate skill level. At this
crucial level, the gap between Britain and the West
European countries is at its greatest – only the US has a
similarly low share of the population at the high intermediate
skill level (Figure 2 right). 
Education and literacy aren’t the same
Measured by years of schooling and qualifications gained,
younger age groups in Britain are considerably better
educated than older age groups. So we might expect to see
higher proportions of these younger age groups in all liter-
acy categories except the lowest. Yet the IALS survey found
no significant difference in the British sample between the
performance of older (46-55 year olds) and younger age
groups – except at the highest level. At the high end of the
literacy scale (Levels 4/5) proportions in the younger age
groups are slightly higher than in the older age groups. This
suggests that more years of schooling and a greater number
of qualifications do not automatically improve literacy and
numeracy and so must lead us to question whether more
education is effective in producing the ability to apply simple
knowledge and understanding in practical situations. 
The IALS provides a unique tool which makes it possible to
confirm positively previous diagnoses of the strengths and
weaknesses of Britain’s skills stock. The greatest deficiency
is at the lowest level and the greatest strength is at the
highest level of literacy competence. The increase in years
of education consumed and qualifications awarded noted in,
for example, the government’s monitoring of progress
towards the National Targets has not produced a corre-
sponding increase in literacy competences.
Low skills hurt the individual
Low levels of literacy contribute to preventing integration
into the economic and social mainstream. The IALS
provides additional evidence to add to what we already
know about poverty, unemployment and low skills. A third of
the unemployed and over a half of those who had withdrawn
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from the labour market scored at the lowest literacy level.
And only around one fifth of those at this literacy level had
incomes which placed them in the top half of the income
distribution. 
The low-skilled are the least likely to receive training at work
or to be exposed to workplace tasks which allow them to
improve or update their skills. The low-skilled who are in
employment engage in work-related reading or writing activ-
ities much less frequently than employees who score at
higher literacy levels. Less than 10% use information from
computers at work at least once a week compared to nearly
40% for those at Levels 3/4/5.
In the home, the low-skilled are also much less likely to use
a personal computer or read a daily newspaper. In other
words, whereas higher skill groups engage in activities at
work and at home which reinforce the literacy competence
already acquired, people with low skills don’t benefit, either
because of the nature of their job, or because they are reluc-
tant to take up what training opportunities are on offer. At
home, a combination of poverty, lack of aspiration and
willingness to make the much greater effort required mean
that the low-skilled are unlikely either to read regularly or use
a computer. They are thus caught in a vicious circle, where
low literacy levels are reinforced rather than improved upon. 
Employers don’t like low skills either
Employers have long moaned about the problems which low
levels of literacy and – to a lesser extent numeracy – cause
in the workplace. In 1996 alone, three authoritative surveys
of employer views on low literacy levels were published. The
employer group Industry in Education claimed that
ÔEmployers are widely critical of candidatesÕ Ôeveryday lifeÕ
literacy and numeracy, and doubt the value of GCSE
ÔpassesÕ in guaranteeing these abilitiesÕ. The Institute of
Directors Business Opinion Survey found that Ôa staggering
79% of the survey were concerned [about literacy and
numeracy in job applicants] and the number rose to 89% in
some regionsÕ. A survey of multinational companies carried
out by the Department of Trade and Industry for the 1996
Skills Audit asked companies to evaluate the literacy skills of
adults and new entrants in five of the companies in which
they operated. As in the IALS, Germany scores higher than
both Britain and the US on literacy standards of both young
and adult employees; and numeracy is also substantially
higher in Germany. Literacy and numeracy standards in the
US are rated as almost identical to those in Britain – again,
a judgement remarkably similar to that provided by the IALS. 
But they could do more to help
Yet British employers are also, perhaps unwittingly,
compounding the problem. In 1986 the growing impact of
international competition on the British economy and the
severe unemployment of the early 1980s had created a
readiness to countenance change in the way vocational
education and training was organised and certificated.
Qualifications with their dual role – they are meant to provide
both the incentive to qualify and act as labour market signals
of skills – were thought to lie at the heart of the British skills
deficit. The deficit, it was argued, did not result from the
quality of the qualifications on offer but from the sheer
number of uncoordinated awarding bodies and levels of
qualification. This, it was thought, led to a lack of trans-
parency in the system generally and contributed to the low
numbers trained. 
There was widespread agreement that what was known as
the ‘jungle’ or ‘maze’ of vocational qualifications should be
modernised and rationalised to achieve greater trans-
parency for all users, and the National Council for Vocational
Qualifications (NCVQ) was set up with this brief. However,
what emerged from this process was a new vocational quali-
fication, the National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) which,
it was intended, should replace all existing certificates. The
NVQ is a set of occupationally-based standards of compe-
tence defined at three or four levels and designed to be
assessed by demonstration of competence in the workplace
by workplace supervisors. There is no separate requirement
for the more general skills of literacy and numeracy to be
developed and assessed for the award of an NVQ. 
This ‘competence-led’ vocational qualification model was
heavily supported by employers. It put the definition of
standards and control of assessment in their hands. It
provided a highly suitable tool or training programme for one
of the pressing problems facing British companies in the late
‘80s – the rapid and cost-effective upgrading of unskilled or
semi-skilled employees to adapt to new technology and
work organisation. While no direct government subsidy was
paid to employers to upgrade employees, the costs of devel-
oping NVQs were heavily subsidised by the government.
But by supporting this ‘no frills’ qualification model, British
employers also ensured that those gaining a vocational
qualification in Britain would no longer be required to
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develop and demonstrate reading and writing skills. The
message was that, as long as you could do the job, employ-
ers were not interested in general literacy skills. This was
short-termism on a grand scale and the failure to reduce the
low-skilled group to the levels of other European countries
must be attributed in part to the clear signal conveyed by the
design of the NVQ. 
Government is to blame as well
But while employer organisations can be accused of short-
termism in failing to provide strong signals on the impor-
tance of basic literacy and numeracy for employment,
responsibility for promoting a set of qualifications which 
fail to promote literacy rests with the government. In 
the European countries – Germany, Switzerland, the
Netherlands and Sweden – which emerge from the IALS
study with good basic literacy skills, government has taken
responsibility for ensuring that vocational training also
includes the development of literacy and numeracy.
Regulations agreed by government, employer and employee
organisations specify that a recognised vocational qualifica-
tion can only be awarded if literacy and numeracy are shown
to be satisfactory alongside more specific vocational skills.
Employers do not pay to develop these general skills – the
cost is borne by the government and by the individual who
will later benefit by increased occupational mobility and
capacity for further learning. 
Individuals too do not always look to the long-term. For adult
learners, particularly those who have not achieved their
potential in the classroom, vocational qualifications recog-
nised on the labour market can constitute a strong incentive
to start learning again. Objectives will necessarily be short-
term – getting back into the labour market – and the longer
term objective of improving basic literacy is thought less
important. But governments can and should look to the
longer term and take action to prevent myopia on the part of
employers and individuals which is damaging to the
country’s longer term growth prospects. The simple model
developed in other European countries uses the strong
incentive effect of recognised vocational qualifications –
which in some countries is enhanced by a link between
qualifications and wage differentials – to allow literacy skills
to ‘hitch a ride’ on the back of more specific vocational train-
ing for which the individual is often highly motivated. 
National Vocational Qualifications have now been in place
for ten years. In 1995 the Beaumont Review Group,
appointed to review the 100 most heavily-used NVQs,
reconsidered some of the fundamental principles on which
NVQs had been based. Beaumont used an Occam’s Razor
approach to recommend that only those core skills (which
include literacy and numeracy) required to perform the
occupation at the level specified should be included in
NVQs. Beaumont again rejected mandatory inclusion 
of core skills in NVQs which must Ôtake account of
employer needsÕ.
The (then Conservative) government’s response to
Beaumont and to serious irregularities which had been
uncovered in the awarding of NVQs was to produce propos-
als for stronger audit and quality assurance systems.
Authority over the regulation of NVQ awards passed from the
accident-prone National Council for Vocational Qualifications
(NCVQ) to a more education-friendly body, the Qualifications
and Curriculum Authority (QCA). But no changes were
recommended to NVQ criteria so as to introduce separate
and distinct key skills units. The development of key skills,
including literacy and numeracy as part of the aims or
outcomes of an NVQ continues to be at the discretion of
sectoral employer organisations (Standard Setting Bodies). 
This situation constitutes a true paradox. Almost a quarter of
the adult population scores at an unacceptably low literacy
level by European standards and employers wring their
hands over basic skills. The new Labour government
promises a renewed campaign to involve all adults in lifelong
learning. But meanwhile, government and employers
continue to promote vocational qualifications which do not
require the development or demonstration of any sort of liter-
acy or numeracy. This is clearly an untenable position. What
are the options?
The Dearing Report on Qualifications for 16-19 Year Olds
argued and won the case for providing courses in basic liter-
acy and numeracy and other skills in all publicly-funded
programmes of education and training for 16-19 year olds.
This means that all those on the new National Traineeships
working for NVQ Level 2 qualifications, and all on Modern
Apprenticeships, working for NVQ Level 3 qualifications
must be given opportunities to develop literacy and 
numeracy skills and to have them assessed. But the NVQ
qualifications remain unchanged by this new policy. There is
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But by supporting this ‘no frills’ qualification
model, British employers also ensured that
those gaining a vocational qualification in
Britain would no longer be required to 
develop and demonstrate reading and writing
skills. The message was that, as long as 
you could do the job, employers were
not interested in general
literacy skills. 
still no requirement for literacy and numeracy skills to be
developed and assessed in order to gain an NVQ award.
And the Dearing recommendation does not, of course, apply
to the population aged over nineteen.
Building on the NVQ framework
NVQs have many weaknesses apart from the lack of attention
to key skills, weaknesses which can and should be remedied.
But they also have important strengths. They have the support
of an important constituency of employers and they develop
skills and competences relevant to the way jobs are currently
performed in this country. For many in work and preparing for
work they therefore constitute an objective worth working for.
Broadening the content of NVQs to include literacy and
numeracy skills should have the effect of motivating many
adults who currently have low literacy and numeracy to
improve those skills.
The aim should be to include within the NVQ framework the
key skills currently outside it. This needs to be done without
burdening employers with the additional cost of providing and
assessing literacy skills training. As is the case in all other
European countries and for young people on government
sponsored training schemes in this country, costs should be
shared between the individual and the government.
A new test for individuals...
It might therefore be more realistic and in line with the
pressures on companies and on individuals in the labour
market to think in terms of requiring the full NVQ award to be
dependent on the individual taking and passing an externally-
set test of basic literacy and numeracy – similar perhaps to
those developed for the IALS survey. The initiative for prepar-
ing for the test and for making arrangements to take the test
could rest with the individual rather than with the company
(rather along the lines of the theory paper now part of the
driving test). Suitable courses and other help with learning
could be available from a variety of sources including the new
University for Industry, the workplace, or a local college. The
test could be attempted as many times as necessary for a
pass and administered in a variety of local centres.
An additional advantage of such a test is that it would intro-
duce an important element of standardisation into the NVQ
award and improve the reliability of the current regime. There
might be some difficulty in motivating individuals to take the
test in order to achieve a full NVQ. Here, employers could
play an important role by referring to NVQs in job advertise-
ments or using them as one of the criteria for job progres-
sion. Most important, however, the costs of preparing for and
administering the tests would not fall on companies but on
the government (development of teaching software, course
material, tests and test administration) and on individuals
(opportunity cost).
...means a new test for government
But what are the chances of such a measure being adopted?
The most recent statements of intent from the new Labour
government seem to hold out the promise of progress. The
Department for Education and Employment is just completing
consultation on post-16 qualifications. The consultation
document sets out the government’s commitment to
‘upgrade vocational qualifications, underpinning them with
rigorous standards and key skills’.
But while this commitment appears to promise much, it is
worrying that the consultation document holds out the possi-
bility of incorporating key skills within NVQs as a requirement
for their attainment only to reject it in the next breath with the
usual objections about distorting occupational requirements,
and disincentives to employers.
The new government has wisely not closed the door on
further development of NVQs and has promised a continuing
process of improvement. Ministers’ response on the issue of
key skills for all will show whether they are prepared to
defend the long-term interests of adult learners. This means
ensuring that insistence on the development of key skills is
not confined to qualifications aimed at young people.
Improving the ability to understand and communicate in the
workplace and in everyday life must become a major objec-
tive of the vocational qualifications that are the aim of adults
in work and preparing for work. 
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Ministers’ response on the issue of key skills
for all will show whether they are prepared
to defend the long-term interests of adult
learners. This means ensuring that insistence
on the development of key skills is not
confined to qualifications aimed
at young people.
Hilary Steedman is Programme Director of the CEP’s Human
Resources Programme.
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T
he introduction of a national minimum wage was one
of the most specific commitments of the Labour
Party in opposition, and it is one which Tony Blair’s
new government moved quickly to implement after
the election in May last year. The Low Pay Commission,
charged with recommending how and at what level the new
minimum wage should be set, will report in May, and the
legislation is expected to be in place by early 1999. Trade
unions and low pay campaigners are delighted; employers
now recognise, some more grudgingly than others, that they
have lost this particular battle. But are they right to see a
minimum wage as something they don’t like but will have to
live with? Or could some of them at least look forward to
some positive gains?
The traditional arguments...
The minimum wage debate has tended to focus on the
problems of low pay. Setting a national minimum wage, it is
argued, will prevent employers from exploiting workers; it
should also help cut the cost of social security by saving
money on income top-up schemes such as family credit. It
may also encourage more people to seek work. But
opponents say it will increase employers’ labour costs,
reduce competitiveness and destroy jobs. They challenge
evidence which suggests that few if any jobs will be lost if
the right level is chosen.
...obscure other factors
The argument over lost jobs, however, has tended to mean
that other factors have been overlooked. In particular, little
attention has been paid to the impact which a minimum
wage might have on other labour-related costs faced by
employers: recruitment and staff turnover. Many tradition-
ally low-paid jobs are either hard to fill, or have a high level
of turnover. If a minimum wage were to encourage more
people to enter the labour force, some employers could
expect to fill vacanices more quickly, saving on both
recruitment advertising and other costs, and on the lost
output associated with longstanding vacancies. Higher
hourly rates in some low-paid jobs might also have a
beneficial impact on staff turnover: quite simply, some
workers might be more inclined to stay in one job for
longer. That also saves on recruitment costs; it might even
improve productivity if workers become more committed to
their jobs.
Recruitment costs matter
Research at the CEP has examined recruitment costs in
sectors which traditionally have a disproportionate number
of low paid workers: the hotels and fast food restaurants. In
the hotel industry, the total cost of hiring, induction and train-
ing was £352 per vacancy; for the fast food business it was
£685. Yet the median hotel recruit stays in a job for only ten
months. Fast food restaurant staff move even more quickly,
staying only eight months in a job. Over a year, then, recruit-
ment costs are a substantial element of total costs. What’s
more, managers in the Centre’s survey estimated that it took
eight weeks for a hotel recruit to become as productive as
established workers; in fast food restaurants, it takes twelve
weeks – nearly half the median length of stay in a job.
Productivity in these industries, therefore, is much less than
its potential level.
One conclusion to be drawn from these figures would be
that firms spend too much on training and recruitment. But
lower standards are unlikely to help employers in such
competitive industries. Alternatively, firms could try matching
applicants more carefully with job vacancies available, so
lowering staff turnover and reducing hiring costs as a
fraction of total labour costs. A minimum wage could help
employers to do this.
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What do I get?
As British employers gear up for the introduction of a national minimum
wage, Donna Brown reports on research in the CEP which suggests
there could, in some instances, be benefits to both sides of industry.
How some employers 
might benefit from a
national minimum wage
by Donna Brown
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Groups affected
All workers
Specific group 
of workers
April 1995
Basic food hygiene
training introduced.
Plant stability
guaranteed by
company
rationalisation.
Line leaders training
initiated
May 1995
Trainees and the
unskilled receive 
pay increases
significantly greater
than the rate of
inflation. Other groups
see smaller rises.
November 1995
Change of culture,
embracing team
briefings. New
canteen with 24
vending facilities.
May 1996
Sick pay introduced.
Annual leave accrued
from the start date.
Annual leave
increased from 15 to
17 days. All workers,
except trainees
receive pay increases
above inflation.
Unskilled workers
deriving the greatest
benefit.
Table 1 Changes affecting workers at the food manufacturing plant
Figure 1 Staff survival rates by year of joining company
Percentage of workers/months Key  n 1994   n 1995   n 1996
3 6 9 12 150
10
0
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
3210
70
60
80
90
100
The effect of raising pay: a case study
The Centre has also looked at what factors can affect tenure
in low paid jobs, by examining the case of a food manufac-
turing plant in detail. Before being taken over by a national
food manufacturer, this plant was typical of many such
operations with a large number of low paid workers: average
job tenure was low, and the plant’s overall performance was
poor. The new owners set out to improve the low rates of
staff turnover, by altering pay and conditions.
The carrots offered
Table 1 shows the sequence of changes made over a period
of thirteen months. In April, the new employers started to
change the corporate culture. Basic food hygiene training was
introduced for all workers, and training for line leaders was
also started. Then in the May 1995 pay round, trainees and
unskilled workers got the largest pay rises, 5.5%, or about
one and a half times the prevailing rate of inflation; most other
workers took a real pay cut, getting increases worth about two
thirds of the inflation rate. These deliberately uneven increases
were designed to reduce much higher turnover rates among
the two worst affected categories of workers.
Then in November 1995, the company introduced further
changes to working conditions. Team briefings were 
Some workers might be more inclined to stay in one job for longer. That also saves on recruitment
costs; it might even improve productivity if workers become more committed to their jobs.
introduced as part of the effort to change the existing
culture. New canteen facilities were introduced, incorporat-
ing for the first time twenty-four hour vending facilities to
cater for shift workers.
The 1996 pay round once again brought unevenly distrib-
uted rises. This time trainees did less well, getting only
1%, at a time when inflation was 2.2%. Semi-skilled staff,
skilled workers, engineers and section leaders all had
wage rises comfortably in excess of inflation. But by far 
the biggest rise went once more to unskilled workers, who
got 6.5%.
The employers’ reward
Figure 1 (left) shows the extent to which these cumulative
changes improved staff tenure at the plant. It is clear that
the first three months in a job are the most critical. Of
those staff who started in 1994, 60% left during their first
twelve weeks – a strikingly high figure. In 1995, when the
changes started this percentage had fallen to little more
than half the earlier level: only 33% left during their first
twelve weeks. The improvement continued into 1996 –
only 10% left in the first critical period. The figure rose
again in 1997, to 20%, but this was still only a third of the
1994 level.
The improvement in staff retention is visible if we look
beyond the first three months. The longest period which
can be properly compared within the survey is fifteen
months. Before the changes in pay and working condi-
tions, only 20% of workers stayed for as long as fifteen
months. But of those staff joining in 1996, when most of
the changes had been implemented, twice as many, 40%,
were still in post after fifteen months.
Better working conditions or more pay?
Sophisticated statistical analysis enables us to determine
which of the changes introduced had the greatest beneficial
impact on staff turnover. Table 2 (below) shows that all the
changes had a significant impact: but that the pay increases
in May 1996 (when unskilled workers benefited most) had
most effect. This suggests pay rises are more likely to
encourage workers to stay in a job than improved working
conditions.
Lessons for others?
The Centre’s study shows that the recruitment costs for the
manufacturer in the case study are lower than many service
sector companies we have examined. But at £154 per new
recruit, they are not negligible. The plant manager estimated
that it takes seven to eight weeks for new staff to become
fully productive – pretty much in line with the service indus-
tries we looked at. Our results show that currently about one
new recruit in twenty leaves the company within the first
eight weeks of joining, compared with one in five in 1994.
Wage costs have risen, but reduced turnover saves the
company in question significant amounts of money.
It’s always difficult to draw too many lessons from a single
case study. But both elements of the Centre’s study suggest
that there may be some scope for employers to save
substantial sums by improving staff tenure and productivity,
especially in sectors where many workers tend to be among
the lower paid. For some workers, the benefits of a minimum
wage are obvious. It’s possible that while less immediately
apparent, there may be benefits to some employers as well.
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Time of change
April 1995
May 1995
November 1995
May 1996
Type of change
Training introduced 
Greater company stability
Pay rises, benefitting trainees 
and the unskilled
Canteen and team briefings
Pay rises, benefitting primarily 
the unskilled
Reduction in probability of leaving
30%
25%
24%
49%
Table 2 How improved pay and working conditions lowered labour turnover
Donna Brown is a Research Assistant at the CEP.
The first three months in a job are the most critical. Of those staff who
started in 1994, 60% left during their first twelve weeks. 
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t’s no secret that the number of part-time workers in
Britain has risen dramatically in recent years. That most of
these workers are women is also well-known: more
women – particularly mothers – have started working at a
time when service sector employment has been rising
sharply. But one important consequence of these changes
has attracted much less attention. While the number of part-
time jobs has risen, the quality of part-time work has
declined almost as rapidly. Part-time workers have seen
their relative earnings fall substantially. Twenty years ago
there was virtually no difference between the average hourly
earnings of full- and part-time women workers. But in 1994-
95 (the most recent year for which full figures are available)
part-time women workers had seen their average earnings
per hour fall to 69% of their full-time colleagues. The oppor-
tunity for women to combine work and family through part-
time employment has come at a high price.
Sneering at part-timers?
The popular view of part-time workers is hardly favourable.
Part-time jobs are seen as bad jobs, offering low pay and
little job security to a poorly skilled section of the labour
force. As a result, while part-time work has become a more
important component of employment (part-time jobs
accounted for fewer than one in twenty jobs in 1951 but one
in five by 1991) it has at the same time come to be seen as
a labour market problem. It has, for example, been
suggested that part-time employment is a form of disguised
underemployment; that part-timers are taking full-timers’
jobs; and that part-time earnings do little to alleviate poverty
or reduce inequality (since these jobs go to women who live
in households where there is already another wage-earner).
Part-time work has been particularly berated in the face of a
secular decline in full-time permanent male jobs. This
attitude was summed up in 1994 by John Prescott, now
Deputy Prime Minister, who said: If I want to create employ-
ment, should I target full-time men who are on the dole and
may never get a job, or should I encourage low paid part-
time employment for mostly middle class women? 
Others, such as Patricia Hewitt (now a Labour MP), have
argued that part-time work is one of the many new forms of
flexible working patterns which we can expect to become
increasingly common. By enabling women to combine work
and family life, part-time work is likely to be part of a growing
labour market trend as women’s employment rates generally
increase. Significantly, women’s part-time earnings have
been shown to be increasingly important in keeping families
out of poverty. 
Men and women go their different ways
The last decade has seen significant differences emerge in
the employment patterns of men and women. The number of
men in full-time employment has fallen by 5% while the
Why are part-time
women workers
losing out?
by Susan Harkness
Women now make up a bigger proportion of the workforce than ever
before: but part-time women workers have seen their incomes fall
relative to full-time women. Susan Harkness asks why.
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number of part-time male workers has more than doubled.
Men now account for 15% of all part-time employees – still
a relatively small proportion. By contrast, there are now
11% more full-time women workers than ten years ago; but
the number of women working part-time has still risen faster,
by 15%. 
There have also been large changes in the composition of
the female workforce, with more women of child
bearing/rearing age working full-time (although these
women also have the highest rates of part-time employ-
ment). Significantly, women over 50 or under 25 have
accounted for most of the increase in part-time work. It is
notable too that while at any point in time less than one-third
of women are working part-time, double that number – three
in five women – have at some time been employed part-time
(a proportion that stayed constant right through the 1980s
and 1990s). Most part-time women have had children
(90%, compared with 47% of full-timers). 
Free to choose?
The decision to work part-time is, for most women, a volun-
tary one. Yet there is also a significant minority of women
who have taken part-time employment solely because they
have been unable to find full-time work. In recent years, this
proportion has increased. Figures from the Labour Force
Survey show that in 1994, 12% of women aged 21-60
working part-time were doing so because they could not find
full-time employment. This is a big jump from 1984 when just
7% of part-time women would have preferred full-time work.
Many more part-time women workers would prefer more
hours while remaining part-time: 11% in 1980, 17% by
1993. All this suggests rising underemployment amongst
female part-timers. 
Yet interestingly, there’s also substantial evidence to suggest
that the reverse holds true for many full-time women. Both
the Women and Employment Survey (1980) and the British
Household Panel Survey (1994/5) show that a substantial
number of women working full-time would prefer to work
fewer hours; this proportion has been rising, from 35% in
1980 to 46% in 1994-95. For professional full-time women
workers, those figures are even higher: in 1994-95, 55% of
professional full-timers would have preferred fewer hours.
When we remember that part-time women now earn signifi-
cantly less per hour than their full-time counterparts, it’s hard
to avoid the conclusion that part-time women are crowded
into low skill occupations because part-time employment is
not available in more highly skilled jobs. 
But another explanation has been offered for the incidence
of low pay amongst part-time employees. According to the
International Social Attitudes Survey, levels of job satisfac-
tion are higher among part-time than full-time workers,
suggesting that non-pecuniary benefits may offer some
compensation for lower rates of pay. Thus, while few part-
timers think their job is well paid, they are more likely to
report that their job has flexible working hours and good
management relations; and fewer describe their job as
boring or stressful. Differences in expectations, however,
may go some way to explaining these disparities. 
Low paid...
So how acute is the problem of low pay among part-time
women workers? Back in the 1970s, this was a phenome-
non that didn’t really exist: both part-time and full-time
women had roughly comparable average hourly earnings. In
those days, however, all women were considerably less
well-paid than men. In the years since then, full-time working
women have done a great deal of catching up – their pay
relative to that of full-time men has improved significantly.
Part-time women, however have seen little change in their
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It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that part-time women are crowded into low skill occupations 
because part-time employment is not available in more highly skilled jobs. 
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Figure 2 Earnings ratios of PT women to FT women
across the wage distribution
Figure 1 Earnings ratios of PT women to 
FT women and men
pay relative to men, while their pay relative to full-time
women has dropped sharply, as can clearly be seen in
Figures 1 and 2 (left). In 1973 part-time women earned an
average hourly rate equivalent to 59% of that for full-time
men and 96% of that for full-time women. The introduction
of the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts in December
1975 led to a sharp rise in the relative earnings of both full-
time and part-time working women. 
However, while full-time women saw their relative average
earnings continue to increase gradually throughout the
following decades, the picture was very different for part-
time women. Their earnings gain from introduction of the
Acts was quickly reversed; by 1984 their average hourly
earnings were only 61% of those for full-time men – barely
more than a decade earlier. The following years saw very
little improvement in this position; but far more significantly,
part-time women saw themselves fall substantially behind
their full-time counterparts.
...and low skilled
So do part-time women have fewer skills than other
workers? Table 1 (above) looks at the educational attain-
ments of different groups of employees between 1974 and
1992. In the mid-1970s all female workers were much less
well-qualified than men, though the differences were less
pronounced among younger workers. It’s clear that part-
time women workers were, at that stage, as well-qualified as
full-time women. But by the early 1990s, full-time women
workers had improved the level of their qualifications relative
to men. There was little difference in the proportion of men
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While few part-timers think their job is well paid, they are more likely to report that their job has
flexible working hours and good management relations; and fewer describe it as boring or stressful.
Table 1 Composition of employment by education and age
1974/76 1990/92
Men Women Women Men Women Women
FT FT PT FT FT PT
All Aged 21-60 100 100 100 100 100 100
Degree/Higher 11.7 8.2 4.4 27.3 20.0 10.7
A Levels or 5+ O Levels 13.1 14.2 9.6 19.3 25.3 18.8
1-4 O Levels or equivalent 24.1 21.4 16.8 27.3 31.9 32.2
No qualifications 51.2 56.2 69.2 26.1 22.7 38.4
Age 21-24 9.3 15.8 3.8 9.2 15.6 4.0
Degree/Higher 12.0 11.9 12.1 19.3 15.5 12.4
A Levels or 5+ O Levels 26.3 25.7 14.0 29.4 36.6 21.1
1-4 O Levels or equivalent 28.6 35.1 27.2 40.2 42.0 49.3
No qualifications 33.1 27.4 46.7 11.1 5.8 17.2
Age 25-34 28.4 23.4 25.4 29.5 30.4 24.4
Degree/Higher 15.0 12.4 5.5 29.6 24.6 10.0
A Levels or 5+ O Levels 17.1 17.3 12.7 24.0 31.1 25.0
1-4 O Levels or equivalent 27.2 28.2 24.5 31.2 35.0 45.1
No qualifications 40.7 42.1 57.4 15.2 9.4 19.9
Age 35-49 37.1 35.6 44.9 41.0 38.0 48.1
Degree/Higher 11.5 7.2 4.3 30.0 20.8 12.1
A Levels or 5+ O Levels 11.2 11.0 9.8 17.5 19.1 17.8
1-4 O Levels or equivalent 23.5 17.0 15.2 23.2 29.4 30.3
No qualifications 53.8 64.9 70.7 29.3 30.6 39.9
Age 50-60 25.2 25.3 25.9 20.2 16.0 23.5
Degree/Higher 7.9 3.7 2.6 22.0 13.7 8.2
A Levels or 5+ O Levels 6.5 8.7 5.5 12.1 19.1 14.1
1-4 O Levels or equivalent 19.8 13.0 10.5 24.5 23.1 20.3
No qualifications 65.8 74.6 81.5 41.4 44.2 57.5
Source: General Household Survey
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Note: * Sample sizes too small
Source: Family Expenditure Survey
About a fifth of part-time workers still earn amounts comparable to the highest paid full-time
women; but most other part-timers are concentrated into low paid and low skilled occupations.
1977 GHS
Non-manual – professional and managerial * 8 2
Non-manual – not managerial or professional 79 60 42
Personal services 101 6 21
Skilled manual 124 9 7
Semi-skilled manual 97 14 9
Unskilled manual 98 3 19
All occupations 80 – –
1994/5 BHPS
Non-manual – professional and managerial 90 24 5
Non-manual – not managerial or professional 87 56 54
Personal services 88 5 15
Skilled manual 87 5 3
Semi-skilled manual 111 8 8
Unskilled manual 101 2 13
All occupations 73 – –
and women under 35 who had a degree or higher qualifica-
tion: indeed, a significantly larger proportion of men had no
qualifications. Full-time women over 35 remained less well
qualified than their male counterparts, but the gap was small
and considerably lower than it had been in the mid-70s.
But for women working part-time the story is very different.
Part-time women workers were better educated than they
had been in the mid-1970s: but by the early 1990s, they
lagged considerably behind both men and full-time female
employees, even after controlling for differences in age
composition. This may go some way towards explaining the
deterioration in their relative earnings position. 
New divisions are opening up
It would be a mistake, however, to see all part-time women
as low-skilled and low-paid; the picture is considerably more
complicated. Not all part-timers have seen a decline in their
relative earnings over the last decade, as can be seen
clearly if we look at earnings at different points of the part-
time wage distribution. In the mid-1970s about a fifth of part-
time women – those in the top fifth of the income distribution
– earned considerably more per hour than their full-time
counterparts; apart from these, average earnings for full and
part-time women were pretty similar right across the job
spectrum. But in the following decades not only had part-
time women generally fallen behind those in full-time work:
but the gap between the two groups of workers widened
substantially at the lower end of the pay scale. About a fifth
of part-time workers still earn amounts comparable to the
highest paid full-time women; but most other part-timers are
concentrated into low paid and low skilled occupations.
Thus, much of the gap between part-time and full-time female
earnings can be accounted for simply by looking at occupa-
tional differences between these workers. Table 2 (below)
shows that once we do this the earnings gap is substantially
reduced. Indeed, in 1994-95, those in manual occupations
earned on average over 90% of the amount received by full
timers in the same occupations, while even those in other
occupations earned over 80% of the full-time rate. 
Table 2 demonstrates that the occupational structure of full-
time and part-time female employees is substantially differ-
ent, and that this difference has grown over time. In
1994-95, for example, many more part-timers worked in
personal services (15% compared with 5% of full-time
women) and in unskilled manual occupations (13%
compared with only 2% of full-timers); while correspond-
ingly fewer worked in non-manual (but not managerial or
professional) and professional occupations (42% and 2%
respectively compared with 60% and 8% of full-timers).
These differences go a long way towards explaining the part-
time/full-time wage gap among women. Indeed, we calculate
that if part-timers had had the same occupational structure as
full timers the part-time/full-time wage ratio would have been
97% in 1977 and still as high as 86% in 1994-95. The actual
earnings ratio, for those reporting on their occupation, was
just 80% in 1977 and 73% in their occupation, 1994-95.
So what’s the explanation?
Modelling some of this data has helped to clarify some of
PT Women/
FT Women
Female FT 
occupational distribution
Female PT 
occupational distribution
Table 2 Earnings ratios and occupational distribution
the causes behind the differences in relative wages which
we have identified. It’s interesting to note, for example, that
in 1980 marriage significantly reduced the likelihood that a
woman would work start or continue to work full-time; by
1994-95, it had no discernible impact. Far more significant
now is the presence of children. These changes reflect the
general increase in female labour force participation, with
women today being more likely to continue working after
marriage and to take less time out of the labour market
after childbirth. It is also notable that a partner’s weekly
earnings had no impact on the probability of working full-
time in 1980, but by 1994-5 this was a significant factor:
the lower the partner’s earnings, the more likely a woman
was to work more hours.
Table 3 (below) shows that in 1980 differences in charac-
teristics accounted for the entire earnings gap, while differ-
ences in returns actually helped to reduce the wage
differential. Thus in 1980, while part-timers earned an
average wage equal to just 87% of the full-time average,
had part-timers had the same characteristics as full-timers
they would actually have earned on average 10% more
than those in full-time work. 
By 1994-95 the part-time/full-time earnings ratio had 
fallen to 69%, with both changes in differences in charac-
teristics and changes in returns to characteristics
contributing towards this fall. Differences in employment
characteristics accounted for around three-quarters of the
earnings differential while the remainder was attributable to
differences in returns to characteristics. In 1994-95, had
full-time and part-time workers had the same 
characteristics, the earnings ratio would have been as 
high as 92%. 
Between 1980 and 1994-95 the part-time/full-time pay
ratio fell from 87% to 69%. Four fifths of this drop can be
accounted for by changes in the relative characteristics of
these two groups of workers. Thus differences in charac-
teristics not only accounted for the best part of the
earnings gap in both periods but the majority of the fall in
the earnings ratio resulted from the worsening of the
relative employment characteristics of part-timers.
However, over this period it does appear that a penalty for
working part-time did emerge and this made a significant
contribution to the decline in the relative earnings position
of part-time working women.
It seems clear that in spite of the significant gap between
the hourly earnings of full-time and part-time women
workers, part-time work itself imposes no financial 
penalty. Far more important is the tendency for part-time
jobs to be concentrated in low-skilled occupations, and for
part-time women workers in turn to be less well-qualified
than their full-time women counterparts. Many part-time
women workers would prefer longer hours; correspond-
ingly, many full-timers seem to be working longer hours 
than ideally they would like. This latter factor could 
exaggerate the gap between full- and part-time pay rates.
Changes in work patterns, for example, making it easier 
for women to return to work on a part-time basis after
maternity leave, wouldn’t eliminate poorly paid part-time
jobs. But it would help improve the overall quality of 
part-time jobs on offer.
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By the early 1990s, there was little difference in the proportion of men and women under 35 who had
a degree or higher qualification: indeed, a significantly larger proportion of men had no qualifications.
1980 1994/95
Raw earnings ratio 87.2 69.1
Earnings ratio resulting 
from differences in returns 
to characteristics 109.8 91.6
Earnings ratio resulting 
from differences in 
characteristics 79.4 75.4
Table 3 Explaining the female part-time/full-time
earnings gap 
Ratio for female employees (%)
Susan Harkness is a Research Officer at the CEP.
It seems clear that in spite of the significant
gap between the hourly earnings of full-time
and part-time women workers, part-time 
work itself imposes no financial penalty. 
Far more important is the tendency for 
part-time jobs to be concentrated in low-
skilled occupations, and for part-time women
workers in turn to be less well-qualified 
than their full-time women counterparts.
G
lobalisation. Sick of it? Too
bad, there’s more coming
every day in the financial
markets. I’ve worked for a
global securities clearing house; I’ve
built a global securities collateralisa-
tion system; I’m developing a global
foreign exchange real-time gross
settlement system; and my next
project is a global clearing house for
exchange-traded derivatives. I have
lawyer friends writing global standard
netting agreements, accountant
friends implementing global account-
ing standards, IT friends developing
global risk management software,
investment banker friends drafting
global corporate disclosure
standards, trader friends honing
global investment strategies, regula-
tor friends refining global regulatory
requirements, custody friends provid-
ing global back-office outsourcing,
and commercial banker friends
assessing global credit risk on their
borrowers. Quoting Walt Disney, an
early globaliser of mass entertain-
ment, ÔItÕs a small world after allÕ,
and it’s getting smaller with each
rotation of this blue-green ball of
space-dust on its axis.
The aim of all this globalisation is
lower costs, more transparency,
greater efficiency and less risk.
These aims are laudable, in the best
interests of the financial markets and
their users. The practical result will
be lower headcounts, thinner
margins, fewer markets and a shake-
out of less sophisticated players.
These effects are contrary to the
self-interest of many market partici-
pants (if not a majority). The tension
creates a fascinating, ever-shifting
tableau as individuals, firms and
markets struggle to define their
strategic direction, negotiate 
political allegiances and secure
relative advantage in the changing
global climate.
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Globalisation...
Because it’s there!
In this issue’s Weightless Economy column,
Kathleen Tyson Quah considers what’s 
behind the drive for globalisation in the
financial markets.
Globalisation
Kathleen Tyson Quah
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In common with many current devel-
opments, globalisation of financial
markets is driven by technology.
Those promoting new schemes for
globalisation subscribe to the
because itÕs there! rationale for doing
something immensely challenging,
risky and difficult. Like climbing
Everest, an effort to rationalise global
practices and infrastructure will be
widely regarded as worthwhile
despite the lack of any practical
benefit (although there generally is
some). The lure of simpler and fewer
operating systems, better access to
information, and improved risk
management provide those driving
the financial markets with the same
heady intoxication as a lack of
oxygen on the higher slopes of the
Himalayas. Anyone who worries
excessively about obstacles and risks
isn’t going to accomplish anything
notable.
When climbing a mountain, man
confronts the weakness of his body,
his will and the impediments of
terrain and weather. When globalis-
ing market practices and infrastruc-
ture, man confronts the myriad
interdependencies of established
anti-competitive practices, irrational
market constraints, outdated legal
systems, bureaucratic hierarchies
and regulatory intransigence. The
sufficiency of individual effort and
character is important but not
decisive. Knowing the terrain and
predicting the weather still count.
Those building new global systems
or processes must take others up
the slope with them or fail.
Understanding the reasons why
things are done as they are done,
and making the acclimatisation to the
new global standard or system less
disruptive, is proving as critical to
success as any technological
achievement. Evolution and flexibility,
not revolution and dirigisme, have
proven the successful formula for
global systems.
The rush to globalise everything
about the markets is staggering.
Those now ascending the slopes of
globalisation struggle past the
corpses of failed endeavours. There
have been several notable casualties,
but the latest is the CME-Depository
Trust Company, a would-be global
swaps collateral depository, which
fell victim to the inconsistency of
international commercial law and
regulation. Still on the ascent are
multilateral netting and collateralisa-
tion schemes, which struggle to gain
the critical mass which will propel
them to greater efficiency. Straight-
through processing presses forward
despite the difficulties of integrating
various legacy systems into a
modern whole. A raft of global initia-
tives, both within and among market
participants is flowing up from the
foothills. The pace seems to be
intensifying rapidly.
When I first broached the idea of a
global clearing house for exchange
traded derivatives in May 1997, I
was told that it was impossible given
the political imperative of preserving
local clearing franchises (and if it
were a good idea someone else
would have thought of it). Soon after
I was told it was attractive for emerg-
ing markets where resistance to
change was less entrenched and the
need to attract foreign capital would
override parochial interests. When
Eurex (a merger of Swiss and
German exchanges) was announced,
it was suggested that Eurex or the
London Clearing House should form
the central hub, to provide critical
mass and leverage existing infra-
structure to expand worldwide.
Recently I was told that it is only a
matter of time until my global clearing
house is reality – in whatever form –
because the rationalisation of margin
flows and globalisation of risk
management are so compelling.
Some people have expressed several
differing views as their own percep-
tion has changed over the past six
months. 
Friends who told me I was hopelessly
naïve or remarkably brave (read
stupid) are now warning me that if I
delay the initiative beyond the first
quarter of next year someone else will
have built my clearing house instead. 
But what if someone less particular
pushes ahead with my idea before
then? If they succeed, then I have
lost what little proprietary interest I
can claim in a good idea. If they fail
they may poison the well, regardless
of how thoroughly I’ve prepared my
own proposal. I can only pursue the
global clearing house as my own
judgement dictates and hope for 
the best. 
Perhaps there should be some
sensible restriction on the global
projects allowed to proceed at any
given time – a sort of global project
queuing system. Nepal introduced
limits on the number of climbers
allowed to attempt Everest after
years of unrestrained access. The
sheer quantity of frozen bodies,
oxygen tanks and climbing litter
cluttering the slopes got to unman-
ageable and unseemly proportions
as more and more intrepid venturers
heeded the call of the mountain.
Limiting global projects in the finan-
cial markets would create a clearer
path for those with the experience
and preparation which make
success more likely, and would
Perhaps there should be 
some sensible restriction on
the global projects allowed 
to proceed at any given time –
a sort of global project 
queuing system. Nepal
introduced limits on the
number of climbers allowed 
to attempt Everest after years
of unrestrained access.
Globalisation of financial
markets is driven by
technology. Those promoting
new schemes for
globalisation subscribe to 
the because it’s there!
rationale for doing something
immensely challenging, 
risky and difficult.
reduce the wasted effort and
expense imposed on those who
back failed initiatives.
In a similar vein, prominent
Americans have urged Europe to
postpone monetary union, arguing
that the available technical staff and
commercial resources are insuffi-
cient to cope with the year 2000
problem alone, much less in parallel
with transition to the Euro. The fear
is that failure to prepare adequately
for either, or both together, could
plunge Europe into a deep reces-
sion. Grumblings about global finan-
cial projects maturing to
implementation over the same
timescale are beginning to be heard
in the corridors and clubs of the
City. There just aren’t enough staff
with the necessary drive and exper-
tise to successfully implement every
one of the many global systems
changes being promoted. There
ought to be some mechanism for
rationalising all the attempts at 
global rationalisation.
The difficult issue, common to any
proposed constraint on unfettered
capitalism, is who should run the
global project queuing system and
how? Right now the advantage lies
with those institutions able to
accurately survey the complex terrain
and fairly predict the future elements
in order to successfully prepare
themselves for the coming global
operating environment. Why protect
those less diligent, less efficient or
plain unlucky from the effects of their
folly or misfortune?
The pace of cross-border mergers in
banking and financial firms is testa-
ment to the harried preparations for
global markets. Many of the alliances
will prove wiser and stronger than
the component parts. Many may fail
to live up to expectations. Whatever
the result for individual mergers,
overall the markets are increasingly
dominated by global firms with a
global outlook on performance,
competition and service. As long as
some of these firms are going to get
things roughly right as the world
changes, is there any need to
impose artificial constraints on
globalisation?
All major financial institutions and
markets are assessing the cooperate
vs. compete and protect vs. expand
dilemmas in light of their relative
position and strengths on the global
stage and their ability to protect their
home turf from encroachment. No
panel of great and good could be
truly independent in deciding how
much globalisation makes sense,
when and for whom, so no queuing
system is going to save either firms
or markets from having to make hard
choices in uncertain times.
Like it or not, globalisation is going to
change every aspect of the financial
markets for every player in them. As
communications and technology
capabilities improve and costs fall,
more and more globalised process-
ing becomes possible. As more and
more becomes possible, more and
more aspects of markets can be
rationalised through global practices
and systems. Firms and markets
have to respond to globalisation
because more and more is going to
happen. Impediments to globalisation
would be unjustified and impossible
to administer. Globalisation...
Because it’s there!
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Like it or not, globalisation is
going to change every aspect
of the financial markets for
every player in them. As
communications and technology
capabilities improve and costs
fall, more and more globalised
processing becomes possible.
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C E N T R E  f o r  E C O N O M I C  
P E R F O R M A N C E
E
stablished in 1990, the Centre is a unique institution – a policy orientated
research group with a large in-house staff. Based at the London School
of Economics – Europe’s leading social science university – the Centre’s
researchers work on the most pressing issues facing Britain and Europe today:
including unemployment, skills, inequality, productivity, corporate governance,
European Monetary Union and the economic transformation of Eastern Europe.
Most of the Centre’s funding comes from the Economic and Social Research
Council, though we also receive funding from other bodies, including the
European Commission, as well as from the corporate sector.
The Centre has strong links with policymakers of all political parties in Britain, as
well as in the post-communist world, the World Bank, the IMF 
and the European Commission. We also have strong and growing links with
national and multi-national companies through our Senior Business Forum.
Several members and associates of the Centre currently have part-time advisory
positions with the British government.
The Centre boasts an outstanding team of economists and other social scien-
tists. Most are based full-time at the Centre or at the LSE: but senior staff also
hold positions at a range of other distinguished universities – Oxford,
Cambridge, Bristol, Sheffield, York, Harvard, Dartmouth College 
and Stanford.
Senior Business Forum
The purpose of the Forum is to promote
effective interchange between a number of
leading businessmen, academics and journal-
ists about key issues determining business
success. The businessmen are drawn from
the leading 100 companies, the journalists
from The Economist, and the economists from
LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance.
Firms who join will benefit from being part of
the Forum itself, and the CEP Round Table, in
addition to building wider links with the
Centre. From 1998 there will be an annual
dinner when Forum members will receive
reports on the work of the CEP.
Chairmen and chief executives meet 
3 times a year to hear an outstanding and dis-
tinguished speaker and hold a private discus-
sion, followed by buffet dinner – normally at
The Economist building in St. James. Recent
speakers and topics include:
Rudi Dornbusch and Paul Krugman on which
countries will prosper;
John Kay on stakeholding companies; 
Gordon Brown on Labour’s business policies;
Willem Buiter, Gavyn Davies and 
Alan Walters on EMU.
The Round Table
The CEP Round Table consists of one desig-
nated senior executive from each company
and meets 3 times a year at LSE 
to hear a report from a leading academic
(usually from the CEP) on some key 
issues for business, followed by a 
discussion and buffet dinner. Recent 
speakers and topics include:
Richard Layard on skills and training;
Nick Crafts on productivity growth 
and innovation;
Paul Gregg on workless households;
Stephen Nickell on product market competi-
tion and productivity growth;
David Metcalf on the minimum wage.
Activities
The Centre organises a range of activities
– seminars, special lectures and confer-
ences: many of which are open to mem-
bers of the Senior Business Forum and the
public.
Director: Richard LayardTh
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